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COMMENT
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW-CHICAGO'S THIRD MUNICIPAL
AIRPORT-A PROPOSED COURSE OF ACTION
FOR ITS PREVENTION
INTRODUCTION
The vast metropolitan area of Chicago is presently served by two ma-
jor airports-O'Hare International and Midway. Although it was once
thought that these two facilities would be more than adequate to service
the air traffic of Chicago, today, the prevailing view is that the nation's
second largest city is in need of a third major airport. Why does Chicago
need a new airport? The explanation is not very simple. In days past,
it was a relatively easy matter to find a meadow far enough from any
structures to be safe, and level enough to be comfortable for landing and
take-off, but as aircraft grew more sophisticated, so, necessarily, did the
attendant support-facilities and services. Consequently we progressed
from the propellor to the jet; from the grassy knoll to asphalt and con-
crete pavements, continuous and uninterrupted for eight to twelve-thou-
sand feet in length. Technology seems to know no bounds and as a re-
sult, "nearly all of the worlds terminal airports have one thing in common.
They were either obsolete or inadequate on their dedication day."' This
statement is supported by a myriad of statistics, all of which lead to the
conclusion that air travel is increasing at a tremendous pace. Past pre-
dictions as to the volume of passengers, the number of aircraft re-
quired to transport them, and the size and number of the airports neces-
sary to accommodate the air traffic were unfortunately much too inaccu-
rate.
An examination of available statistics reveals the growing disparity
in the types of travel utilized. For the year 1968 the number of pas-
sengers traveling via railroad exceeded 21 million; the number of motor
traffic passengers for the same year was 80,414,200, while the num-
ber of air-traffic passengers was 183,242,000,000.2 During this same
period the average number of kilometers flown was 2,950,753,000. 3 It
1. Donoghue, Planning and Financing Chicago's Municipal Airports, 23 J. AiR
L. & COM. 34 (1956).
2. 1970 BRITANNICA BOOK OF THE YEAR 753 (1970).
3. Id.
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should be obvious from these figures that a distinctly greater number of
people employ air travel than any other mode of transportation, with
this trend increasing by leaps and bounds.4
In 1955 Midway Airport handled 8,751,906 passengers and had total
operations of 297,731. 5 One year later it was estimated that, in 1970,
21,256,000 people would pass through Chicago airports, and of this fig-
ure 5,500,000 would be passengers at Midway.6 In addition, it was also
estimated that the average number of passengers per aircraft would be 60
by 1970 and that total operations by 1970 would be 648,000. 7  These
estimates however, have proven to be erroneous. As early as 1968 Chi-
cago topped the figure predicted for total operations for 1970 by 40,000,
and in 1969 O'Hare Airport handled approximately 32,500,000 passen-
gers.8 In sad contrast to these gargantuan statistics for O'Hare is the fact
that utilization of Midway airport has decreased to a very negligible
amount.
O'Hare now averages 85,000 travelers per day and, as a comparison
of the above figures will reveal, this volume is straining its capacity. Fur-
ther it has been predicted that the passenger volume by 1975 will hit
60,000,000 and by 1980 at least 87,000,000. 9 If past prophecies are
any basis for reliance, these statistics are probably low. It is evident then,
that "by the mid-70's delays in aircraft operations will reach unacceptable
proportions without a third major airport."'10
If one accepts the proposition that a third major airport is needed, the
question quite obviously becomes-where? In order to find the answer,
the city, through its Commissioner of Public Works, conducted several
feasibility studies." As a result of these studies four potential sites were
located:
4. As the number of planes and people to fill them have grown so too has the
number of airports. In 1959 there were approximately 6,400 airports. By 1969 this
figure had swelled to almost 11,000. 1970 REPORT OF THE AIR TRANSPORTATION
ASSOCIATION 43, 44 (1970).
5. Supra note 1, at 36, 37.
6. Supra note 1, at 42-44.
7. Supra note 1, at 42-44. These figures were compiled in a study to de-
termine the size and capacity of O'Hare Airport which was under construction at
the time of the aforementioned article. The statistics were compiled by taking
the 1955 figures for Midway and making calculated projections based upon the
percentages of increase.
8. NEW YORK TIMES ENCYCLOPEDIC ALMANAC 1971 672-73 (1970).
9. DEPT. OF AVIATION, CITY OF CHICAGO, SITE SELECTION FOR CHICAGO'S
THIRD AIRPORT (1969).
10. Supra note 9, at 2.
11. There were two such studies one by Harza Engineering Company and the
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Site A: 12,100 acres of land in Will & Cook counties at the intersection of 1-80 and
1-57.
Site B: 12,600 acres of land in Will & Cook counties north of 1-80 in Homer and
Rich Townships.
Site C: 12,100 acres of land in Will & DuPage counties northwest of 1-55.
Site D: Creation of an 11,000 acre polder site 5.5 miles east of 31st Street in Lake
Michigan. 12
One of the criteria to determine the ultimate site was cost. Hence, the
conservative yet high estimated cost in dollars for each of these sites is:
Site A-$236.7 million; Site B-209.3 million; Site C-443 million; and
Site D-423 million.' 3
In order to narrow the choice even more, other factors were taken into
consideration. First an analysis of ground trips to each site was under-
taken, based upon the assumption that each passenger would seek to
minimize his costs in travelling between airports, and points of origin and
destination. Next, the economic impact on the general metropolitan
area, on the city, and on the available employment opportunities of each
site was studied. Taking all of these factors into consideration, the De-
partment of Aviation recommended to the Mayor that "the lake site is the
most beneficial to the travelling public and to the entire metropolitan
area."'
4
Once it was decided that the lake site would be best, further studies
were conducted as to the manner and method of construction.' 5 The re-
sultant outcome of these studies was a suggestion that a below-surface site
be constructed by means of a polder dike. 16 More specifically, the fin-
other by Real Estate Research Corporation. The studies were begun in 1968 and
summaries were submitted to the Commissioner in early 1970. In addition to the
above authorized study, the Open Lands Project, a conservation group, conducted
and published a study of its own in September of 1968.
12. REAL ESTATE RESEARCH CORP., CHICAGO AIRPORT SITE SELECTION STUDY
(March, 1968). It should be noted that originally it was proposed to use 8,000
acres for the lake site this was later increased to 11,000. In addition the location
has been tentatively moved to east of 55th Street.
13. Supra note 12. These cost estimates include the estimated market value
of land and improvements in the site areas as of 1970, relocation of utilities and
roadways, costs of demolition and grading and miscellaneous fees and contingencies.
These figures are termed conservative since they do not reflect interest which at
present would be about 6.5 per cent for a period of forty years and since the estimate
for the lake site does not include the cost of an access route.
14. Supra note 9, at 5.
15. HARZA ENGINEERING COMPANY, LAKE MICHIGAN AIRPORT PROJECT (Feb.
26, 1970).
16. Supra note 15, at 1, 2. This concept consists of a dike surrounding an
area of the lake bottom which will be dewatered over a period of three months
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ished product would be circular in shape, consuming approximately 11,000
acres of space and requiring about 150,000,000 cubic yards of fill ma-
terial.' 7 At present it is to be located eight and one half miles east of
55th Street at a distance, by automobile, of nineteen miles from the
Loop. 18 The time for construction was estimated at "two years for engi-
neering and design plus five years for site construction, after which con-
struction of aviation facilities . . . [would] begin."'19 At its completion
it will be approximately four miles in diameter, seventeen and one half
square miles in area and four and one half miles from the dike edge to
the shoreline. The preliminary design calls for the runways to be situated
with four parallel NW-SE runways and four parallel NE-SW runways all
of which will be fifty to seventy-five feet from the top of the dike and ap-
proximately three-thousand feet from its base. Finally, although there has
been no decision, or even a specific recommendation as to a mode of ac-
cess, it appears that the option which is most favored is that of causeway
and bridge from the shoreline to within four-hundred feet of the dike
whereupon a tunnel would begin allowing nearly two-hundred feet of wa-
ter for pleasure craft to pass over. Whether the access will be four lane or
eight lane and will include rapid transit lines is undecided. 20
The purpose of this paper is to analyze the aforementioned conclu-
sion-that a third major airport is needed-with the discussion centered
on a concommitant likelihood that the Lake Michigan site will be selected.
The general hypothesis of this comment is that Lake Michigan is not the
and maintained in that state by pumping. The dewatered area is generally termed a
"polder," derived from the Dutch word used to describe such areas in Holland.
This type of dike is not new; it has been used in Holland and elsewhere for 300
years.
17. Supra note 15, at 7. This fill in material is to consist of rock and sand, the
acquisition of which also presents an interesting environmental question. The
Harza report indicates without, however, recommending, that the sand may be
garnered from the dunes at either Grand Haven, Michigan or inland locations in
Illinois and/or Indiana. Similarly, one of the alternatives for obtaining the rock
needed is the construction of a second polder dike over a natural rock bottom also
located in Lake Michigan. Supra note 15, at 3, 8, 9.
18. An interesting aside, in view of the criteria used for selection, is that the
auto distance from the Loop to O'Hare Airport is only eighteen miles.
19. Supra note 15, at summary letter.
20. As to the foregoing facts concerning the lake site construction see generally
supra notes 12, 14, 15; THE OPEN LANDS PROJECT, WILL A LAKE AIRPORT BEST
SERVE THE CHICAGO AREA (September, 1968). The Harza report summary
although, as stated, made no recommendation as to the access, did contain a delinea-
tion of the types of access and their estimated costs. These costs were not based
upon any specific design but rather were based on comparison with structures simi-
lar to those which might be used. A table of these costs are set out below to provide
another insight into yet another facet of the cost of a lake site.
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most appropriate spot for a third major airport. This hypothesis is not, it
should be pointed out, based upon any hard and fast evidence which dic-
tates disaster if a major airport were constructed along Chicago's shores
but rather it is the response to the unanswered questions of the studies thus
far conducted concerning the lake airport, the lack of extensive studies of
the environmental effects of a lake airport, and, most of all, the total dis-
regard of other sites for a third airport, which, although appearing more
practical, are evidently less romantic.
Once the assumption is made that Lake Michigan is not the most ad-
vantageous spot for a third major airport and once it is assumed that this
fact will nevertheless not dissuade the bureaucratic machinery, the foun-
dation is laid for the dissertation which follows-the prevention of the pro-
posed lake airport. The purpose of this paper then will be to examine the
various methods by which an individual can take effective action to prevent
the construction of an airport in Lake Michigan. The steps to be taken,
both judicial and administrative, will be explored, as well as the theories
behind them. The comment has been laid out chronologically-that is,
an attempt has been made to envision the various procedures which the
city will have to take prior to actual construction; and hence a corre-
sponding preventative action has been proposed for each step that the
city must take.
ACQUISITION OF THE LAND
The first logical step toward the completion of a lake airport is the
acquisition of the land upon which it will be constructed. But from whom
Legend
T = all tunnel access. Rapid transit connects to vicinity of McCormick Place
B = all bridge access
BT = bridge with 2-mile tunnel adjacent to polder
TB bridge with 1-mile tunnel adjacent to shore
V = rubber-tired vehicular traffic
RT = rapid transit traffic on tracks
COST
(millions of dollars)
Shore 4 lane 8 lane 4 lane 8 lane
Connection Scheme V only V only V + RT V + RT
McCormick Place
Vicinity B 76 152 108 184
BT 99 198 136 235
TB 88 176 122 210
T 170 340 218 388
55th Street
Vicinity B 50 100 72 122
BT 74 148 99 173
TB 62 124 85 148
T 112 224 161 274
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must the city acquire the land-that is, who owns the land beneath Lake
Michigan?
In an effort to determine who owns these beds, attention must be di-
rected to the common law of England where the origins of our present wa-
ter law may be found. Under the common law it was recognized that the
Crown owned the beds beneath the tidal waters and the rivers, subject to
the right of the people to fish and navigate these waters. 21 Since the
ownership of these lands was an attribute of sovereignty, when the colo-
nies became independent they succeeded to that ownership. 22 However,
this ownership applied only to tidal waters because England had no large
inland bodies of water. Consequently, the doctrine of navigable and
non-navigable waters was invented to provide a dichotomy by which it
could be determined whether title to the beds of the large inland bodies
of water in the United States vested in the state in trust for the public or in
the hands of the private riparian owners. 28  Hence a definition of navi-
gability was formulated:
Those rivers must be regarded as public navigable rivers in law which are navigable
in fact. And they are navigable in fact when they are used, or, are susceptible of be-
ing used, in their ordinary condition, as highways for commerce over which trade and
travel are or may be conducted in the customary modes of trade and travel on wa-
ter. . . . [They constitute navigable waters] when they form in their ordinary condi-
dition by themselves, or by uniting with other waters, a continued highway over which
commerce is or may be carried or with other states or foreign countries .... 24
The consequences of a body of water being defined as navigable are seen
in the decision of Pollard's Lessee v. Hagan wherein it was decided that
upon the admission of a state into the Union, the title in the lands below
the high-water mark of navigable waters passed to the state. 25
Even though a few states allow private ownership to extend below the
21. WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS §§ 35.2-35.2(A) (Clark ed. 1967); see also 1
FARNHAM, WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS § 36 (1904); FRANKEL, LAW OF SEASHORE,
WATERS AND WATER COURSES, MAINE AND MASSACHUSETTS (1969); HALL, ESSAY
ON THE RIGHTS OF THE CROWN AND THE PRIVILEGES OF THE SUBJECT IN THE SEA
SHORES OF THE REALM (2d ed. 1875); Fraser, Title to the Soil Under Public Wa-
ters-A Question of Fact, 2 MINN. L. REV. 313 (1918).
22. Martin v. Waddell, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 367 (1842).
23. WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS § 37.2(c) (Clark ed. 1967).
24. The Daniel Ball, 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 557, 563 (1870). In Illinois navigable
bodies of water include all waters that are navigable in fact and a body of water is
navigable in fact if it was capable of being navigated in its natural state and is pre-
sumed navigable if it was meandered (as was Lake Michigan). MANN, ILLINOIS
WATER USE LAW 12, 13 (1957). See also Wilton v. Van Hessen, 249 Ill. 182, 94
N.E. 134 (1911); People v. Economy Power Co., 241 Ill. 290, 89 N.E. 760 (1909);
Schulte v. Warren, 218 Ill. 108, 75 N.E. 783 (1905).
25. 44 U.S. (3 How.) 212 (1845).
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high-tide line, the general rule is that the states acquired ownership of
tidelands and lands beneath navigable waters by succession to that at-
tribute of colonial sovereignty, 26 or as an attribute of state sovereignty
upon admission to the United States.27 Hence, although the United States
made many grants to private owners, it retained title to the beds beneath
the tidelands and the navigable waters, 28 to be held "in trust for the peo-
ple of the future states, and upon admission to the Union each new state
took title and succeeded to the trusteeship. '29 As the Supreme Court
said in 1892:
It is the settled law of this country that the ownership of and dominion and sover-
eignty over lands covered by tide waters within the limits of the several States, be-
long to the respective States within which they are found. . . . The same doctrine
is in this country held to be applicable to lands covered by fresh water in the Great
Lakes over which is conducted an extended commerce with different States and for-
eign nations.8 0
Since Illinois was admitted to the Union in 1818 on an equal footing
with original states and without distinction as to sovereignty or jurisdic-
tion, and because the Great Lakes are navigable waters within the defini-
tion of these cases, it must be concluded that Illinois acceded to the title to
the land beneath the lake.3' Based upon that conclusion it must be con-
26. Morris v. United States, 174 U.S. 196, 226 (1899); supra note 22, at 410,
416. CI. Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1, 15 (1894).
27. United States v. Oregon, 295 U.S. 1, 14 (1935); Borax Consolidated Ltd. v.
Los Angeles, 296 U.S. 10, 16 (1935); Port of Seattle v. Oregon & W. R. Co., 255
U.S. 56, 63 (1921); United States v. Mission Rock Co., 189 U.S. 391, 405 (1903);
Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1, 26 (1894); Knight v. United Land Assn., 142 U.S.
161 (1891); Weber v. Board of State Harbor Comrs., 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 57, 65
(1873); Pollard v. Hagan, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 212 (1845).
28. United States v. Mission Rock Co., 189 U.S. 391, 404 (1903); Mann v. Ta-
coma Land Co., 153 U.S. 273, 284 (1894); Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1, 48, 51, 58
(1894); San Francisco City and County v. LeRoy, 138 U.S. 656, 671 (1891); Knight
v. United Land Assn., 142 U.S. 161, 183 (1891); Railroad Co. v. Schurmeier, 74
U.S. (7 Wall.) 272, 287 (1868); Mumford v. Wardwell, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 423, 436
(1867); United States v. Pacheco, 69 U.S. (2 Wall.) 587, 590 (1864); Smith v.
Maryland, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 71, 74 (1855); Den v. The Jersey Co., 56 U.S. (15
How.) 425, 432 (1853); Pollard v. Hagan, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 212, 229, 230 (1845).
Cf. Utah v. United States, 304 F.2d 23 (10th Cir. 1962). See generally Bade,
Title Points and Lines in Lakes and Streams, 24 MINN. L. REV. 305 (1940).
29. WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS § 36.4(A), 195 (Clark ed. 1967). See also
cases cited supra notes 25, 26, 27.
30. Illinois Central R.R. Co. v. Illinois 146 U.S. 387, 435 (1892) (emphasis
added).
31. It is interesting to note that in the Illinois Central case the Supreme Court
appeared to say that Illinois took title to the bed of Lake Michigan from her Wiscon-
sin borderline (420 30' latitude) to the middle of the lake. "It is sufficient for our
purpose to observe that they (the boundaries of the state) include within their east-
ern line all that portion of Lake Michigan lying east of the mainland of the state and
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ceded then that if Chicago can obtain title to this land, an airport may be
constructed upon it.a2
ARGUMENTS AGAINST A LAKE AIRPORT
It would be pertinent then, to inquire whether the state of Illinois can
grant the title to these lands to Chicago and perhaps whether they should
grant the title.
If the opinions of the Open Lands Project, several downstate represen-
tatives and other activist groups, 3 are to be considered, the answer to the
latter question is a resounding "no." The arugments of these groups
may be summarized as follows.3 4
COST
As was indicated earlier the cost of a lake site may run as high as one
billion dollars35 before a single runway has even been built. This figure
is greatly in excess of the cost of acquisition of a land site.
TIME
It has already been shown that by 1975 O'Hare will have exceeded its
capacity, yet the time schedule as indicated in the Harza report to the
the middle of the lake, south of latitude 42 degrees and 30 minutes." Supra note
30, at 434. The general rule, however, is that the riparian owner be it a state or an
individual may claim only the bed of the water within which an extension of his
property lines would lie, e.g., Illinois should have title to the beds from 'the Indiana
borderline (extended upward) to the Wisconsin borderline (extended east). The
relevance of this point is apparent upon reexamination of the land to be used by the
City as the site for the lake airport. It is notable that both proposed locations
(31st Street and 55th Street) include at least some land which theoretically belongs
to Indiana.
32. See the discussion in supra note 31.
33. As mentioned previously, The Open Lands Project has fought vigorously
against the proposed airport having published a large fifty-six page rebuttal and
several leaflets condemning the proposal. Similarly, State Representatives Epton,
Maragos, Mann and Klein have introduced bills in the legislature to prohibit an air-
port in the lake. House Bill 48 introduced by Representative Bernard Epton provides
a rather simple solution; it merely amends ch. 19, § 65 of the Illinois Revised Stat-
utes to read: "The construction of any airport facility in any part of Lake Michigan
included within the boundaries of Illinois is prohibited." This bill has passed the
House and is now in the Senate. Other groups which are opposed to a lake site are
the Chicago Pilots Association and the Businessmen for the Public Interest.
34. See generally THE OPEN LANDS PROJECT, supra note 20. Cf. Donoghue,
supra note 1; Berger, Nobody Loves an Airport, 43 S. CALIF. L. REV. 631 (1970).
35. See text and footnotes supra.
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Department of Aviation puts the completion date for a lake site at some-
time late in 1977 or early 1978.
POPULATION
"Current demographic studies indicate a continuing population growth
outward from Chicago, and the area southwest of the City is expected to
be the area of fastest growth in the next several decades."'3 6 More spe-
cifically, the areas south of Chicago, including south suburban Cook and
Will Counties will grow most rapidly in the future. There are predictions
that these counties will surpass the northern and western suburban areas
in population within the next thirty years.37 It should be obvious there-
fore, that an airport site located in the lake will have no travel-time ad-
vantage for a majority of our future population and on the contrary would
prove to be an inconvenience.
POLLUTION
Jet exhaust fumes as well as the exhaust fumes from the autos moving
to and from the airport along a four or eight lane highway may create a
serious air pollution factor.38 Recent studies show the principal sources of
combustible contaminants in America to be: (1) private industry-nine-
teen percent; (2) electrical power generation-twelve percent; (3) space
heating-six percent; (4) refuse disposal-three percent; and (5) trans-
portation-sixty percent. 39 The effect of these increased amounts of SO2,
CO, and NO upon the lake water and the inhabitants of the lake cannot
be discounted. Similarly, because a large majority of the prevailing winds
blow over the lake through the city, instead of fresh lake air Chicagoans
36. THE OPEN LANDS PROJECT, supra note 20, at 6.
37. See generally POPULATION RESEARCH AND TRAINING CENTER AND CHICAGO
COMMUNITY INVENTORY (UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO), POPULATION PROJECTIONS FOR
THE CITY OF CHICAGO AND THE CHICAGO METROPOLITAN AREA: 1970 AND 1980
(1964); NORTHEASTERN ILLINOIS PLANNING COMMISSION, POPULATION FORECASTS
FOR COUNTIES AND TOWNSHIPS IN NORTHEASTERN ILLINOIS: 1975, 1985, AND
1995 (1968); NEW YORK TIMES ENCYCLOPEDIC ALMANAC 1971 (1970).
38. See supra note 20 at 40-41; LANDAW & RHEINGOLD, THE ENVIRONMENTAL
LAW HANDBOOK 275-94 (1971), wherein the authors depict two very recent suits one
against nine airlines by the New Jersey Department of Health for violating that
state's Air Pollution Control Code and one by a California attorney on behalf of the
people of Los Angeles against two hundred polluters including General Motors for
discharging enormous amounts of pollutants (generally auto exhausts) allegedly
constituting a public nuisance. See also Chicago Sun-Times, April 22, 1971 at 7,
24, col. 1.
39. Kalika, The Growing Problem, 39 MACHINE DESIGN 19 (1967); see also
GRAD, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW § 3.01 (1971).
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would receive continuous doses of these contanimants. 40 To date the
city has made no studies as to the effect on the air environment of a site lo-
cated in the lake, nor, to be sure, has anyone else.
As to water pollution the Harza report concludes that: (1) construction
of the dike itself will have no harmful effects except to displace many fish;
(2) waters generated within the dike area will be returned to the city for
treatment (by a new filtration plant?); (3) the improved design of air-
craft indicates that by 1972 aircraft emission will not cause water pollu-
tion; and (5) the five mile buffer zone will prevent any degradation of
the water currents. 4 '
The biggest objection to the above conclusions is that the airlines have
not stopped discharges which could contaminate the water. The airlines
have been cited by the National Air Pollution Control Administration and
have been asked to halt the dumping of about thirteen million pounds of
jet fuel each year in the skies surrounding the airports. These fuel emis-
sions plus the hydrocarbons exhausted as the jet fuel burns could have a
disastrous effect on the plankton and other life in the lake water. 42
The creation of an airport anywhere brings the attendant hazards of in-
cessant, unbearable noise. Only recently a study was disclosed which pro-
posed purchasing huge acreage surrounding O'Hare Airport and rezoning
it for industrial use to create a buffer zone between the airport and residen-
tial areas. 43 Therefore, it is necessary that any airport make adequate pro-
vision for noise.44  The argument that a lake airport would alleviate jet
40. While it is not within the scope of this discussion to investigate the back-
ground and hazards of air pollution in depth it is important to understand that the
possibility of the air being further polluted is quite serious. Why? Because there is
no way to clean the air once it becomes polluted. Air pollution is for the most part a
phenomenon of urban living that occurs when the capacity of the air to dilute the
pollutants is overburdened. It is true that plants will increase the amount of oxygen
in the air, but they cannot remove the particulate matter nor the other types of
nauseous gases. Hence, when cleaning up the air is discussed what is really meant
is the prevention of adding additional pollutants to what is already in the atmosphere.
The consequences of failing are the results of polluted air. "Polluted air is
causing, or aggravating bronchitis, asthma, emphysema, and lung cancer. It is mak-
ing people more susceptible to pneumonia, and making it hard for elderly persons to
breathe." NELSON, AMERICA'S LAST CHANCE 8 (1970). See also GRAD, supra note
40, at § 3.01, 6-7.
41. Supra note 20, at 13, (14).
42. See generally Chicago Sun-Times, April 22, 1971, at 7, 24, col. 1.
43. Chicago Today, July 26, 1971, at 1, 22, col. 1.
44. It should be noted that the reason why provision for excess noise by aircraft
must be made by the planners is because litigation by residents is almost invariably
futile when they are seeking injunctive relief. See, e.g., Swetland v. Curtiss Air-
ports Corp., 41 F.2d 929 (N.D. Ohio, 1930); Brandes v. Mitterling, 67 Ariz. 349, 196
P.2d 464 (1948); Delta Air Corp. v. Kersey, 193 Ga. 862, 20 S.E.2d 245 (1942);
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aircraft noise is specious. A lake airport would result in the concentra-
tion of this noise over what is now densely populated residential areas.45
DESTRUCTION OF NATURAL BEAUTY
One of the arguments which is most onerous to both the planners and
the protesters of the proposed lake site is that, if allowed, the lake airport
would destroy the scenic beauty of our shoreline. Although this argu-
ment is discounted simply because aesthetic qualities are incapable of em-
pirical measurement, it is one of the strongest arguments one can espouse.
No one can measure the damage to the environment which would be
caused by strip mining the Grand Canyon or turning Yellowstone Park
into a waste disposal center; yet surely no one would advocate these
things. Similarly, the loss of so much of our lake would have no less ca-
tastrophic an effect. 46
Burnham v. Beverly Airways, Inc., 311 Mass. 628, 42 N.E.2d 575 (1942); Smith v.
New England Aircraft Co., 270 Mass. 511, 170 N.E. 385 (1930); Atkinson v. Ber-
nard, Inc., 223 Ore. 624, 355 P.2d 229 (1960); Crew v. Gallagher, 358 Pa. 541, 58
A.2d 179 (1948); Batcheller v. Commonwealth, 176 Va. 109, 10 S.E.2d 529
(1940).
Nearby residents to airports have made some inroads, however. Today most
courts allow a recovery for noise damage by means of a taking under the fifth
amendment. The theory being that an easement was created by the flights over the
property which diminished its use and consequently its value. This is somewhat of a
Pyrrhic victory to the man who thinks his home is his castle. See, e.g., United
States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256 (1946); Griggs v. Allegheny County, 369 U.S. 84
(1961).
45. See THE OPEN LANDS PROJECT, supra note 20, at 27-34. Cf. Goldstein,
Jet Noise Near Airports: A Problem in Federalism, Property Rights in Air Space and
Technology, in PORT OF NEW YORK AUTHORITY, COMMENTS ON THE PROBLEM OF
JET AIRCRAFT NOISE 2, 8 (1966); Tondel, Noise Litigation at Public Airports, 32
J. AIR L. & COM. 387 (1966). "For the current large commercial aircraft, the zone
of excessive noise extends outward a distance of about five miles beyond the runway
for a half width of 3% of a mile (each side of centerline for takeoff) and for landing
a distance of about four miles for a half width of % mile. Within these zones near
a major airport, outdoor living is intolerable and residences, schools, churches, hos-
pitals and all other uses which should enjoy reasonable peace and efficiently function
must be designed or corrected for adequate noise isolation." VENEKLASEN AND
Assoc., NOISE EXPOSURE AND CONTROL IN THE CITY OF INGLEWOOD, CALIFORNIA
159 (1968). It should be evident then that since at least two runways will be facing
directly toward the city and be five miles or less away, those along the lakeshore will
experience the continuous din of aircraft emerging into the sky.
46. Bernard S. Cohen, a recognized figure in environmental litigation, in a re-
cent article, argues very strongly against wholesale use of the "destruction of natural
beauty" argument. He points out that it is important to fully understand the prob-
lem you are attempting to solve as well as the solutions proposed. To do other-
wise is to propagate the environment for the environment's sake-to trade one evil for
another-what he calls the "engineering mentality." 76 CASE AND COMMENT 3
(Sept.-Oct. 1971).
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PANDORA'S BOX
There is consensus among airport planners and designers that airports
need to occupy ever increasing areas and that one of the consequences of
building an airport is the immediate growth in population in surrounding
areas. 47 It is, therefore, only natural to assume that even if all the studies
made heretofore are correct they will prove futile as to the protection of
the environment and the lakefront. Shortly after the runways are laid,
new and nearby housing will be needed for the airport employees, 48 hotel
and motel chains will compete vigorously for lakefront leases to house in-
coming passengers, 49 and new access highways will be called for to allevi-
ate the traffic jams occuring on the single access four lane highway.50
The list goes on ad infinitum, ad nauseum.
47. See, e.g., Donoghue, Planning and Financing Chicago's Municipal Airports,
23 J, Air L. & Com. 34, 58, 66 (1956). "Extreme effort must be made to develop the
maximum amount of non-aviation revenue for the air .... If attractive concessions
and services are offered to the passengers . . . they will be patronized widely and
provide the terminal operator with income to offset some of the heavy expense ... "
Id. at 66. The author also suggests leasing land at the end of the runways to indus-
tries whose use wouldn't conflict with the airport use in order to help bear the brunt
of the operating expenses. See also Comment, Air Law-The Memory Lingers On:
Ad Coelum in the 1970's-Some New Approaches, 20 DEPAUL L. REV. 525 (1971);
Tondel, Noise Litigation at Public Airports, 32 J. AIR L. & CoM. 387 (1966); Wal-
ther, Effect of an Airport on Real Estate Values, in PORT OF NEW YORK AUTHORITY,
A REPORT ON AIRPORT REQUIREMENTS & SITES IN METROPOLITAN NEW JERSEY-
N. Y. REGION (1961); Walther, Effect of Jet Airports on Market Value of Vicinage
Real Estate 27 APPRAISAL J. 465 (1959); Walther, The Impact of Municipal Air-
ports on the Market Value of Real Estate in the Adjacent Areas, 22 APPRAISAL J.
15 (1954). Note also that in a study of the effect of a new airport in New York it
was concluded that "the very existence of an airport creates its own demand for
housing. Those people who are employed both at the airport itself and at the indus-
trial plants attracted to the area by the presence of the airport will require housing."
Hammer and Co., Assoc., The Economic Effects of a New Major Airport, in PORT
OF NEW YORK AUTHORITY, supra note 47, at 14.
48. "It is an interesting fact that whenever airports are built, they immediately are
surrounded by new real estate development." Letter from Austin J. Tobin, Executive
Director Port of New York Authority, to Norman N. Newhouse, editor Long Is-
lands Press, September 27, 1962, cited in Berger, supra note 34, at 671.
49. "Airports attract all sorts of industrial uses because of the availability of
rapid transportation. These in turn attract commercial interests to service the in-
dustries." Berger, supra note 34, at 675. See also Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine in
Natural Resource Law: Effective Judicial Intervention, 68 MICH. L. REV. 473 (1970).
"When land is no longer available for development, pressures build to "make"
new land. It is not uncommon for states to convey submerged lands to private
owners ...... Id. at 503.
50. "Even if all of this . . . traffic could be handled by a single four or six-lane
roadway to the airport, the effects of bad weather . . . (or) a major traffic acci-
dent . . . could block access to the airport completely for hours or days. . . . [I]t is
obvious (then) that additional roadways from the shoreline to the airport would be
required...." THE OPEN LANDS PROJECT, supra note 20, at 38.
The logical inference to be drawn from all of these considerations is
that a lake site for Chicago's third major airport should not be the pre-
ferred choice. There are too many unanswered questions and too many
questionable answers. Attention must next be given to whether the state
can grant the title to the Lake Michigan beds to the city for use as an air-
port. More specifically, is it possible to stop the grant of title to the City
of Chicago? One means which might be utilized effectively toward this
end is the public trust doctrine.
PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE
The public trust doctrine5 is far from recent. Its origins may be
readily discerned in the common law and in the early writings of Eng-
land.5 2 Its basis is, as pointed out previously, that initially the sov-
ereign or Crown owned title to the beds of the tidal waters beyond the
high water mark subject to certain rights of the public-these rights being
generally the right of navigation and of fishing. 58 This trusteeship was
in turn passed on to the federal government and then to the states. The
very essence of this doctrine is that there are
resources which have required ages for their accumulation to the intrinsic value and
quality of which human agency has not contributed, [for] which there are no known
substitutes, [and they] must serve as the welfare of the nation. In the highest
sense, therefore, they should be regarded as property held in trust for the use of the
race rather than for a single generation and for the use of the nation rather than for
the benefit of a few individuals. . . .54
Hence, the government, be it state or federal, is the public guardian of
those valuable natural resources which are not capable of self regenera-
tion and for which substitutions cannot be made. In this role the gov-
ernment has a high fiduciary duty of care and responsibility to the gen-
eral public which may not be abandoned by acquiescence 55 or "wholly
alienated by the states." 56
51. LANDAU & RHEINGOLD, THE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW HANDBOOK 1.8, 2.4, 4.9,
5.8 (1971); 1 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS § 36.4(B) (Clark ed. 1967); SAX, DE-
FENDING THE ENVIRONMENT (1970); Cohen, The Constitution, The Public Trust
Doctrine and the Environment, 1970 UTAH L. REV. 388 (June 1970); Sax, The Pub-
lic Trust Doctrine in Natural Resource Law: Effective Judicial Intervention, 68
MICH. L. REV. 473 (1970); SATURDAY REVIEW, Oct. 3, 1970, at 55.
52. Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resource Law: Effective Judi-
cial Intervention, supra note 51 at 475.
53. Supra note 51 at 476.
54. Report of The National Conservation Commission, S. Doc. No. 676, 60th
Cong. 2d Sess. 109 (1909).
55. State v. Cleveland and Pittsburgh R.R., 94 Ohio St. 61, 80, 113 N.E. 677, 682
(1916).
56. Brickell v. Trammell, 77 Fla. 544, 559, 82 So. 221, 226 (1919).
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The exact length and breadth of that trusteeship, however, is as yet ill
defined. It is not an absolute trust completely beyond the police power
of the state, but by the same token to make it subject to mere reasonable
exercise of police power subject to judicial review is to abdicate its pur-
pose. The result has been that the courts have formulated a meaning
somewhere between these two poles. This meaning is composed of sev-
eral considerations. If these considerations are met, a grant of trust
property will be upheld. If they are not, the grant will be struck down
whether it be to an agency of the government57 or to an individual.5s
The most significant standard is that the transfer be necessary for the
promotion and benefit of the public beneficiaries of the trust. One con-
sideration in determining necessity is whether or not there is an alterna-
tive to the transfer of the trust property. In further considering the neces-
sity of the proposed transfer the courts consider certain indicia in deter-.
mining whether or not the public interest will be promoted. These indicia
of promoting the public interest include: (1) public control; (2) pub-
lic use and purpose; (3) will the resource be changed (e.g., will a lake
remain a lake or will an estuary remain an estuary); (4) will other uses
of the resource be greatly impaired; (5) will the change offer greater con-
venience to the public at large.59
As already noted, the bed of Lake Michigan from the high water mark
belongs to the state which holds it in trust for the people.60 Bearing in
mind the above criteria for granting this trust property to another, it may
be beneficial to examine the leading case involving the trust doctrine.
In the case of the Illinois Central Railroad v. Illinois,61 the Illinois legis-
57. See, e.g., Sacco v. Department of Public Works, 352 Mass. 670, 227 N.E.2d
478 (1967) in which the residents of a town enjoined the Department of Public
Works from filling a "great pond" (lake) to relocate a state highway.
58. See, e.g., Gould v. Greylock Reservation Commission, 350 Mass. 410, 215
N.E.2d 114 (1966) and Priewe v. Wisconsin State Land and Improvement Co. 93
Wis. 534, 67 N.W. 918 (1896).
59. Fairfax County Fedn. of Citizens Assns. v. Hunting Towers Operating Co.,
Civil No. 4963A (E.D. Va. filed Oct. 1, 1968) a recent and successful use of the
trust doctrine since the builders withdrew their plans on July 10, 1970 and the ac-
tion was dropped; State v. Public Service Commission, 275 Wis. 112, 118, 81 N.W.2d
73, 74 (1957), wherein most of these factors were initially set out.
60. See text and footnotes supra.
61. 146 U.S. 387 (1892). The case is interesting in many ways and compares
favorably with the facts presented in the present instance. First both involve a large
grant of land in Lake Michigan-the lake site will need eleven thousand acres, the
Illinois Central got one thousand acres. Secondly, both involve transportation fa-
cilities, which were and are in their separate capacities extremely necessary at their
particular juncture in time.
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lature made an extensive grant of about one thousand acres of submerged
lands in fee simple to the Illinois Central Railroad. That grant included
all the land underlying Lake Michigan for one mile out from the shoreline
and extending one mile in length along the central business district of
Chicago. Four years after the original grant the legislature repented and
brought an action to have the original grant declared invalid. The Su-
preme Court upheld the state's claim holding an express conveyance of this
type involving trust lands to be beyond the power of the legislature. They
concluded:
That the State holds the title to the lands under the navigable waters of Lake Michi-
gan, within its limits. . . But it is a title different in character from that which
the state holds in lands intended for sale. . . . It is a title held in trust for the people
of the State, that they may enjoy the navigation of the waters, carry on commerce
over them, and have liberty of fishing therein freed from the obstruction or inter-
ference of private parties. The interest of the people in the navigation of the wa-
ters and in commerce over them may be improved in many instances by the erection
of wharves, docks and piers therein, for which purpose the State may grant parcels
of the submerged lands; and, . . . so long as their disposition is made for such pur-
pose, no valid objections can be made to the grants. It is . . . grants of parcels
which, being occupied do not substantially impair the public interest in the lands and
waters remaining, that are . . . sustained in the adjudged cases as a valid exercise of
legislative power .... 62
The Illinois Central case provides, then, a broad base upon which an ac-
tion could be brought to prevent a grant by the state to the city of the ad-
jacent beds in Lake Michigan for the expressed purpose of building a lake
airport thereon. Admittedly, the Illinois Central case leaves a few voids;
namely, that it was a suit against a private party, whereas the proposed
suit would be against a municipality. Furthermore, the problem of stand-
ing arises, since the Illinois Central action was brought by the Attorney
General on behalf of the people of the state asking for redress for the leg-
islature's previous action in granting the property; the proposed suit, on
the other hand, would involve one citizen or a group. However, the prob-
lem of standing may no longer be a barrier because several recent cases
have opened the way to class suits by concerned conservation groups. 68
62. Illinois Central R.R. Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 452 (1892).
63. The basic question dealing with standing is how minimal the interest a per-
son or group suing may have in the matter of the lawsuit and yet be allowed to bring
action. In Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968) the Supreme Court held that a tax-
payer is within the "zone of interest" necessary to give him standing to challenge an
expenditure of public funds. The Court followed this with a decision that business
groups who would be only slightly affected by the government's activities had stand-
ing. Association of Data Processing Service Organizations v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150
(1970). But the leading decision in this area is Scenic Hudson Preservation Confer-
ence v. F.P.C., 354 F.2d 608 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied 384 U.S. 941 (1966)
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That the suit is against a municipality as opposed to being against an
individual would not in and of itself bar the success of the suit. As
stated previously, suits against a legislative body or an agency may be
as successful as a suit against a private grantee if the aforementioned
criteria are met.
Although there is a very distinct probability that a suit of this type could
be won,64 what are the alternatives if it should fail? There are several, the
first of which would be an action to prevent the city from proceeding with
the fill-in itself. That is, assuming an action has been brought against the
State to restrain it from granting title to the land beneath Lake Michigan
and this action has been lost, it would be incumbent to try to prevent the
actual construction. One manner of doing this is found in the Illinois
statutes.
Since the Illinois Constitution now permits an individual (or many
individuals i.e., a class action) to bring suit against a polluter on his own
behalf, the Illinois statutes would provide an effective basis for a com-
plaint. 15 Similarly, the Attorney General's office could also contest the
fill-in. However, as will be seen, there are several administrative pro-
cedures which may first be utilized, before a complaint is brought.
wherein the federal court determined that the conservation group had standing to
intervene in the FPC hearings as an "aggrieved party," although it had no appreciable
economic interest in the area. "Special interests," such as the preservation of
scenic beauty, fish and wildlife have also been deemed sufficient. See also Nash-
ville 1-40 Steering Comm. v. Eillington, 387 F.2d 179 (6th Cir. 1967), cert. de-
nied 390 U.S. 921 (1968); Office of Communication of the United Church of Christ
v. F.C.C., 359 F.2d 944 (D.C. Cir. 1966); Road Review League v. Boyd, 270
F. Supp. 650 (S.D. N.Y. 1967).
64. As set out in the text the criteria for the setting aside of a grant of trust prop-
erty seem to have been adequately met in the present instance. That is, initially the
property transferred will not benefit all the public whether or not it will benefit a sub-
stantial majority is not even known. Secondly, there are several reasonable and in
many respects better alternatives to the trust property proposed. Thirdly, in con-
sulting whether or not the public interest will be promoted it is plain to see that the
public will not have complete control over the trust property; the resource itself will
be considerably different from its proposed use (that of being a lake); other uses such
as boating, swimming, fishing and beauty of the resource will be impaired; and fi-
nally the change will not offer any greater convenience to the public to justify the
grant. See also ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 19, § 63 (1969) which provides a strong basis
for contending that an action under the public trust doctrine could be fruitful: "The
Department of Public Works and Buildings shall plan and devise methods, ways and
means for the preservation and beautifying of the public bodies of water of the
State, and for making the same more available for the use of the public ....
65. "Each person has the right to a healthful environment. Each person may en-
force this right against any party, governmental or private, through appropriate
legal proceedings subject to reasonable limitation and regulation as the General As-
sembly may provide by law." ILLLINOTS CONsT. art. XI, § 2.
ILLINOIS STATUTES
The jurisdiction and supervision over all the public waters of the State of
Illinois is in the Department of Public Works and Buildings, Division of
Waterways: 6 6
It shall be the duty of the Department of Public Works and Buildings to have a
general supervision of every body of water within the State of Illinois, wherein the
State or the people of the State have any rights or interests, whether the same be lakes
or rivers, and at all times to exercise a vigilant care to see that none of said bodies
of water are encroached upon, or wrongfully seized, or used by any private interest
in any way, except as may be provided by law and then only after permission shall be
given by said department, and from time to time for that purpose, to make accurate
surveys of the shores of said lakes and rivers, and to jealously guard the same in order
that the true and natural conditions thereof may not be wrongfully and improperly
changed to the detriment and injury of the State of Illinois.6 7
The Department is given rather broad powers over public waters as de-
fined. It has the power to inquire into encroachments and to make and
enforce orders to secure public waters from encroachment, wrongful seiz-
ure, or improper private use. 68 It is the duty of the Department to in-
vestigate attempts to interfere with navigation69 or attempts to assert
rights with reference to docks and wharves, access to and egress from
navigable waters, 70 to check all waters for encroachments, 71 to receive
complaints of encroachments by any citizen and, on request, to hold public
hearings, take evidence and enter orders defining the rights and interests
involved and prescribing duties. 72 Further, the Department may make
orders only after notice and hearing73 and may bring an action in court to
recover a fine of up to $1,000 for failure to obey its orders. 74
The most important portion of the act for the purposes at hand is sec-
tion 65. Section 65 provides that it is
unlawful to make any fill or deposit of rock, earth, sand or any other material . . .
or commence the building of any other structure, or to do any work of any kind
whatsoever in any of the public bodies of water within the State of Illinois, without
66. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 19, § 52-78 (1969); MANN, ILLINOIS WATER USE LAW
13-15 (1957).
67. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 19, § 54 (1969). This statement in and of itself
would provide much of the basis for an action under the public trust doctrine.
68. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 19, § 54 (1969).
69. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 19, § 56 (1969).
70. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 19, § 57 (1969).
71. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 19, § 60 (1969).
72. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 19, § 55 (1969).
73. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 19, § 74 (1969).
74. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 19, § 74 (1969).
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first submitting the plans ... to the Department of Public Works and Buildings
and receiving a permit therefor. . . .75
The section goes on to provide a restriction on said construction: "the
building . . . shall be in aid of and not an interference with the public
interest or navigation . . . ., Even more beneficial is the provision
which specifies that this section also applies to a "city or municipality. '77
As to penalties, section 65 is quite explicit and quite stringent: "Any struc-
ture, fill, or deposit erected or made. . . in violation of this Section . . .
is a purpresture and may be abated as such at the expense of the . . . city,
or municipality. . .. ,,78 Further, although a permit may be issued there
must be: (1) a statement approving the action by all the riparian owners
whose egress to public water will be affected as a condition precedent to
the granting of the permit; (2) approval of the Governor; and (3) a hear-
ing preceded by ten days notice in a paper of general circulation.7 9 Section
65, when read with other provisions in the act, presents a very real method
of delaying and even halting any attempt to proceed with the building of
an airport in the lake.
It is not illogical to assume that once the city has received a grant from
the state that it would of necessity seek a permit to fill this land.80
It would then be incumbent upon the citizenry to attend the public hearings
provided for in section 65 and to voice objections. Those objections
could be based upon section 54 of the act,8 1 or section 6382 or even sec-
tion 6588 or they could well include all these plus the public trust doctrine
75. ILL. REV. STAT. Ch. 19, § 65 (1969).
76. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 19, § 65 (1969).
77. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 19, § 65 (1969). This provision is both relevant and
helpful since most of the other sections of the act (i.e., § 54, 56, 60) speak of pri-
vate encroachment and provide remedies for them. This section therefore specifi-
cally takes note that a city or municipality may also encroach upon public waters of
the State and may also be punished for doing so.
78. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 19, § 65 (1969).
79. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 19, § 65 (1969). It should also be noted that each
permit may last only forty years but may be renewed-a provision which has du-
bious value.
80. It is conceivable that the city might seek to get the permit first or attempt to
get the grant and the permit simultaneously. In either case the logic remains the
same and similar arguments could be used whichever course is taken.
81. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 19, § 54 (1969) provides in part that the Department
is "to make accurate surveys of the shores of said lakes and rivers, and to jealously
guard the same in order that the true and natural conditions thereof may not be
wrongfully and improperly changed to the detriment and injury of the State of
Illinois." (emphasis added).
82. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 19, § 63 (1969) indicates a desire to maintain and
preserve the beauty of the public bodies of water in the state.
83. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 19, § 65 (1969) rather succinctly phrases some of
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pleas set forth previously. Should these arguments fail and a permit is
granted by the Department, section 75(a) provides additional relief: "All
final administrative decisions of the Department of Public Works and
Buildings hereunder shall be subject to judicial review. . .. -s4 New ac-
tions could be brought and carried up the judicial ladder.
FEDERAL STATUTES
Nevertheless, even those actions brought under the Illinois statutes
would be but a stepping stone; there are additional possibilities. Because
of the duty of the federal government to maintain and regulate interstate
commerce there have been many acts passed as the vehicles with which
to implement those duties. One such act is the Rivers and Harbors Act of
1899.85 Section 401 of that Act provides:
It shall not be lawful to construct or commence the construction of any bridge,
dam, dike, or causeway over or in any ... navigable water of the United States un-
til the consent of Congress to the building of such structures shall have been ob-
tained and until the plans for the same shall have been submitted to and approved by
the Chief of Engineers and by the Secretary of the Army. .... 86
The section goes on to add a provision that the type of structures afore-
mentioned may be constructed without the approval of Congress, if it is
wholly within the limits of a single state and that state legislature gives its
consent.
8 7
It would appear then, that for Chicago to construct the proposed
causeway and bridge to the lake airport, they will need the approval of the
legislature, and perhaps the Chief of Engineers and the Secretary of the
Army.
The Act does not stop there, but section 403 states:
1I.t shall not be lawful to excavate or fill, or in any manner to alter or modify the
course, location, condition, or capacity of any port, roadstead, haven, harbor, canal,
lake, harbor or refuge ...of any navigable water of the United States, unless the
work has been recommended by the Chief of Engineers and authorized by the Secre-
tary of the Army prior to beginning same.88
This section provides even more impetus. Obviously the fill-in contem-
the public trust doctrine defenses that grants must be in "the public interest" and in
furtherance as opposed to hindering "navigation."
84. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 19, § 75a (1969).
85. 33 U.S.C. §§ 401-13 (1964).
86. Rivers and Harbors Appropriation Act of 1899, 33 U.S.C. § 401 (1964)
(emphasis added).
87. 33 U.S.C. § 401 (1964).
88. Rivers and Harbors Appropriation Act of 1899, 33 U.S.C. § 403 (1964) (em-
phasis added).
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plated for the proposed lake site is of the type included in this section of
the Act. Therefore, even before beginning construction, the project must
be submitted to the Corps of Engineers and, in the final analysis, not
merely rubber stamped but "recommended" by the Chief of Engineers.
It may be relevant then to inquire: (1) What are the criteria which
the Corps uses; and (2) is its decision appealable through the judicial sys-
tem?
The criteria which the Corps uses today are set out in the Corps of Engi-
neers Administrative Procedure.89 Pursuant to the National Environmen-
tal Protection Act 90 and other legislation relating to the environment,9 ' a
memorandum of understanding between the Department of the Army and
the Department of the Interior was consummated on July 13, 1967, es-
tablishing policies and procedures for processing permit applications for
dredging, filling and excavating in the navigable waters of the United
States. One of the important policies of the letter which is now part of
Corps of Engineers Administrative Procedure is:
The Secretary of the Army will seek the advice and counsel of the Secretary of the
Interior on difficult cases. If the Secretary of the Interior advises that proposed op-
erations will unreasonably impair natural resources or the related environment,
including the fish and wildlife and recreational values thereof, or will reduce the
quality of such waters in violation of applicable water quality standards, the Secre-
tary of the Army . . . will either deny the permit or include such conditions in the
permit as he determines to be in the public interest, including provisions that will as-
sure compliance with water quality standards established in accordance with law.92
Similarly inclined is the procedure to grant the permit. Upon receipt of
an application, all interested parties are notified including the various
state conservation, resource and pollution agencies. These parties are
then advised to conduct studies as to the proposed work and advise the
District Engineers of any actual or potential pollution. The District
Engineers will then hold public hearings. Finally, the District Engineers
will weigh all of these factors and forward their recommendation to the
Chief of Engineers and the Secretary of the Interior.93
89. 33 C.F.R. § 209.120 (1970).
90. National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. § 4321 (Supp. V
1970).
91. See, e.g., Federal Water Pollution Control Act, as amended, 33 U.S.C. §§ 466
et seq. (1964); Fish and Wildlife Coordination Act, as amended, 16 U.S.C. 9H 661-
666c (1970); Fish and Wildlife Act of 1956, as amended, 16 U.S.C. §H 742a et seq.
(1970).
92. 33 C.F.R. § 209.120 (1970).
93. 33 C.F.R. § 209.120 (1970). These provisions are appropriately entitled
"Procedures For Carrying Out These Policies."
In addition, the Corps must take cognizance of the National Environ-
mental Policy Act in and of itself wherein a new policy recognizing the
profound effect of each and every arm of governmental activity on the
environment was formulated. Section 102 of that Act attempts to imple-
ment this policy by declaring:
The Congress authorizes and directs that . . . all agencies of the Federal Govern-
ment shall include in every recommendation or report on proposals for legisla-
tion and other major Federal actions significantly affecting the quality of the hu-
man environment, a detailed statement by the responsible official on -(i) the envi-
ronmental impact of the proposed action, (ii) any adverse environmental effects . . .
(iii) alternatives to the proposed action, (iv) the relationship between local short.
term uses of man's environment and the maintenance and enhancement of long-
term productivity, and (v) any irreversible and irretrievable commitments of re-
sources which would be involved in the proposed action should it be implemented. 94
However, to regard these phrases as a panacea would be gross error. All
too often in the past the pen has lacked the finely honed edge necessary to
cut through the debris and stop those who seek to advance in the name
of industry rather than humanity. It is when these platitudinous phrases
fail that other relief must be sought. This new relief may be found in the
judiciary since under the Administrative Procedure Act 5 one has stand-
ing to gain review of an administrative action in court if he has "suffered
legal wrong" or is "aggrieved by agency action." This section is not new
and has been utilized many times but, more importantly, it may be utilized
to appeal the issuance of a permit by the Corps of Engineers. In the case of
Citizens Committee For Hudson Valley v. Volpe96 the New York State De-
partment of Transportation had proposed construction of a six-lane arterial
expressway along a ten-mile stretch of the Hudson River's eastern bank.
The proposed construction would have required the dredging and filling-
in of a portion of the Hudson along the shoreline. Since the Hudson is a
navigable water, the approval of certain agencies was needed. Pursuant to
sections 401 and 403 of the Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899, the Corps of
Engineers issued a permit for the construction of the highway. The plain-
tiffs in this action were two citizen conservation groups who appealed this
finding basing jurisdiction on the Administrative Procedure Act, sections
94. 42 U.S.C. § 4332 (Supp. V 1970). Since the Corps is an "Agency of the
Federal Government" it should be readily apparent that any recommendation they
make must be construed in light of this section. In addition any conclusion of the
Corps must be accompanied by detailed explanation of any and all possible environ-
mental effects.
95. 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1970). "A person suffering legal wrong because of agency
action, or adversely affected or aggrieved by agency action within the meaning of a
relevant statute, is entitled to judicial review thereof."
96. 425 F.2d 97 (2d Cir. 1970).
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701 and 702. The appellate court ruled in favor of the plaintiffs. It is
clear, therefore, that a hypothetical suit against the City of Chicago could
be predicated on these same statutes and there is no reason to assume that
an adverse ruling by the Corps could not be appealed in the same manner
and, hopefully, with the same results.
Assume for the moment that title to the beds of Lake Michigan has
been granted, the State of Illinois has issued a permit and the Corps of
Engineers has done likewise. All the judicial actions thus far brought
have failed. Yet there is one element necessary before construction may
begin-money. Since the cost of a lake airport may run as high as one
billion dollars, the city must somehow raise these funds to finance the
construction. Furthermore, since securing a bond issue for an amount this
large is doubtful, the city would definitely approach the federal government
for the necessary funds. In so doing, a new method for prevention of the
airport appears. This possibility is predicated upon several recent acts
passed by the federal government to protect our natural resources and
monuments. Although the theory is somewhat tenuous, it should be ex-
plored.
PROTECTION OF NATURAL RESOURCES AND MONUMENTS
One of the reasons advanced for seeking to halt the proposed airport in
the lake is not the pollution possibilities, since they have not been truly
ascertained as yet, but rather, the immediate destruction of the magnificent
lake and its shoreline. To replace the aesthetic beauty of this huge body
of water with a four or eight lane expressway and thousands of cubic feet
of particulate matter from incoming and outgoing jets is abhorrent. In
an effort to prevent the loss of our natural resources, acts have been
passed to secure "national monuments," "historic landmarks," and "other
objects of historic or scientific interest."' 97 In 1935, Congress declared a
national policy in favor of preserving historic sites, buildings and objects of
national significance for the inspiration and benefit of the people of the
United States. 98 For present purposes, the most important of these acts
is the National Historic Preservation Act of 1966.09 This act is prefaced
with a most pertinent statement of declaration by Congress:
[11n the fact of ever-increasing extensions of urban centers, highways, and resi-
dential, commercial, and industrial developments, the present governmental and
nongovernmental historic preservation programs and activities are inadequate to in-
97. Antiquities Act of 1906, 16 U.S.C. § 431 (1970). See also National His-
toric Preservation Act of 1966, 16 U.S.C. 470 et seq. (1970).
98. 16 U.S.C. H9 461-467 (1970) (emphasis added).
99. 16 U.S.C. H§ 470 et seq. (1970).
[Vol. XXI
1971] COMMENT 229
sure future generations a genuine opportunity to appreciate and enjoy the rich heri-
tage of our Nation. . . .100
Section 407a of this act authorizes the Secretary of the Interior to pre-
pare a national register of significant objects and resources in need of
preservation and authorizes grants to be made to the various states for their
protection.' 0 ' Even more significant is section 470f which provides
that the head of any federal agency
having direct or indirect jurisdiction over a proposed Federal or federally assisted
undertaking in any State . . . shall, prior to the approval of the expenditure of any
Federal funds . . . take into account the effect of the undertaking on any district,
site, building, structure, or object that is included in the National Register.' 02
In effect, therefore, this provision prevents any federal funds from being
allocated without consideration by the head of the agency making the
allocation of the possible effects on items of historical and natural impor-
tance. This is not dissimilar to section 102 of the National Environmen-
tal Protection Act, previously discussed. Hence, it should be apparent that
if the city of Chicago is to build an airport in the lake at a cost of about one
billion dollars103 federal funding will be required. The agency providing
the money must therefore, consider the ultimate effect of the airport on
the lake and shoreline of Chicago as a historical or natural resource, or
more specifically its aesthetic aspects. Furthermore, under the Adminis-
trative Procedure Act,10 4 this decision would be appealable through
the courts.
In Kent County Council For Historic Preservation v. Romney"°5 precisely
this occurred. In early 1961 the city of Grand Rapids had applied for a
loan from the federal government to be used in an urban renewal project.
Part of the land in question contained the city hall which like most city
halls was very old and was considered an historic monument. The plain-
tiffs sought an injunction to stop the construction based upon section 470f
of the National Historic Preservation Act,10 claiming jurisdiction under
100. 16 U.S.C. § 470 (1970). Surely that "heritage" includes the Great Lakes
just as it includes the Grand Canyon and the Liberty Bell.
101. 16 U.S.C. § 470 (1970).
102. 16 U.S.C. § 470 (1970). For the sake of argument it will be assumed the
Lake Michigan as a part of the Great Lakes is at present included on the "National
Register." As to whether an action could be brought to force the Secretary to include
it has not been considered.
103. See text supra.
104. 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1970). For a discussion of the applicability of this provi-
sion see text and footnotes supra.
105. 304 F. Supp. 885 (W.D. Mich. 1969). See also Western Addition Com-
munity Organization v. Weaver, 294 F. Supp. 433 (N.D. Cal. 1968).
106. Kent County Council For Historic Preservation v. Romney, 304 F. Supp.
885, 888 (W.D. Mich. 1969).
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section 702 of the Administrative Procedure Act.1'07 Although the plain-
tiffs did not succeed because the court found that the National Historic
Preservation Act is not retroactive,' 0 8 no such impediment would pre-
vent an action of this type against the building of a third major airport for
Chicago.
CONCLUSION
The primary purpose of this discussion has been to examine a particu-
lar problem and to suggest methods of solving it. The solutions sug-
gested are not intended to be exhaustive. In addition to those theories
discussed above, there are a number of other possibilities which could
conceivably and probably should be investigated. A number of these
theories are based upon the "higher law" provisions in the Constitution
and the Bill of Rights. For example, one may argue that there is an in-
alienable right, contained in the Constitution, to have clean air and water
and to the protection of our natural resources. This right it may be argued,
is embodied in the language of the ninth amendment which explicitly rec-
ognizes that there are certain rights, though not contained within the
Bill of Rights, which exist and are not to be denied. 10 9
One further tactic which could be used is of debatable value. It is of
questionable value because it would be utilized after the fact-that is
once the airport is constructed and is found to be causing some environmen-
tal damage, this strategy could be utilized. Unfortunately, since it would
be used after the airport has been constructed and is in operation the re-
lief granted would probably be diminished as the scope of the action had
diminished. More specifically the plaintiffs would no longer seek to pre-
vent the construction of the airport via injunctive relief but rather the
specific pollution would be sought to be abated. The result would be that
some of the problems referred to earlier would not be alleviated. For ex-
ample, because compensation rather than injunctive relief would be
granted to the sufferers of excessive airport noise, 1 0 the residents in the
107. Id. at 889.
108. Id. at 888.
109. U.S. CONST. amend. IX. 'The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain
rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people."
See also, Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965); Esposito, Air and Water
Pollution: What to Do While Waiting For Washington, 5 HARV. CIv. RIGHTS-CIv.
LIB. L. REv. 32 (1970). It should be noted that a strong basis for an argument of
this type is to be found within the confines of the Illinois Constitution. Although
phraseology is not strong enough to make a clean environment an absolute right the
section does provide that it is "(t)he public policy of the State and the duty of each
person . . .to provide and maintain a healthful environment for the benefit of this
and future generations ...... ILLINOIS CONST. art. 11, § 1.
110. Supra note 44.
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high rises on the lake would continue to suffer. Moreover, it is doubtful
that any court or board would require the four or eight lane expressway to
the airport to be removed simply because it caused air pollution which af-
fected nearby bathers or presented an inconvenience to boaters who had to
travel miles into the lake to bypass the airfield. For these and other rea-
sons the Illinois Environmental Protection Act"' is of dubious impor-
tance in the immediate instance. Hence, it and its provisions shall be men-
tioned only in passing.
Under the EPA anyone can make a complaint. 112 The regional office
of the Environmental Protection Agency then investigates it and if pollu-
tion is occuring they notify the polluter. 1 13 If the problem is not cor-
rected it may be referred to the Pollution Control Board;" 4 a hearing is
scheduled and notice given to the polluter." 5 At the hearing the Agency
attempts to prove a violation; and citizens' testimony may be heard." 6
If a violation is proven, the polluter may attempt to show reasonable cause
to remain operating (hardship) or that he is complying. 117
A violator faces five possible penalties: (1) Up to $10,000 for each vio-
lation; (2) up to $1,000 a day for each day continued; (3) cost of
fish or aquatic life killed by the violation; (4) injunction against con-
tinuing the violation; (5) revocation of a permit previously issued."18 If
the Board order is not obeyed, the Attorney General or the State's Attor-
ney of the county in which the violation occurred can enforce the order
111. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 111%, § 1001 (1969).
112. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 111'2, § 1030-31 (1969).
113. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 111 , § 1031 (1969).
114. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 111%, § 1031 (1969).
115. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 111 , § 1031 (1969).
116. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 1112, § 1031 (1969).
117. "After due consideration ... (of all the testimony and evidence) the
Board shall issue and enter such final order . . . as it shall deem appropriate under
the circumstances. . . . In making its orders and determinations the Board shall
take into consideration . . .: (i) the character and degree of injury to, or inter-
ference with the protection of health, general welfare and physical property of the
people; (ii) the social and economic value of the pollution source; (iii) the suita-
bility or unsuitability of the pollution source to the area in which it is located, in-
cluding the question of priority of location in the area involved; and (iv) the tech-
nical practicability and economic reasonableness of reducing or eliminating the
emissons, discharges or deposits resulting from such pollution source." ILL. REV.
STAT. ch. 111 , § 1033(a)(c) (1969). The foregoing is a list of the criteria recom-
mended for use by the Board in determining whether or not injunctive relief is to be
granted. The list is not to be all-inclusive. It does, however, provide an "out" if
the Board so desires it, but it is a limited out since the act further provides that if
"hardship" is found a written opinion need be written listing the reasons. ILL. REV.
STAT. ch. 111 , § 1035 (1969).
118. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 111 , § 1042 (1969).
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by prosecution in the circuit court. 119 The Act also provides other in-
teresting possibilities such as a variance wherein a polluter may continue
to pollute for one year by showing hardship.' 20 Nevertheless, the Act does
have useful tools. Review by the appellate court is permitted for: (1) any
party to a pollution board hearing; (2) any complainant whose hearing is
denied; (3) anyone who is denied a variance or a permit; (4) any per-
son adversely affected by a final order or determination by the pollution
board.1'2'1 Quite simply, an individual may utilize the court system under
the EPA after having sought his remedy through the administrative meas-
ures set forth. If nothing else, however, these procedures are cumbersome
and time consuming.
Just as the solutions offered were not intended to be exhaustive, so too,
neither were they intended to be exclusive in their application to airports
or to Lake Michigan. For example, the trust theory discussed previously,
may be viewed as the basis of an action to prevent construction of the
proposed stadium or to prevent further sale and development of lake
front property for high rise apartments or other non-public uses. 12 2 An-
other possibility would be the use of the Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899 to
prevent any further attempts to aggrandize Lake Michigan by Chicago or
by any municipality.
Admitttedly, there are problems yet to be unravelled with each of the
theories discussed. The discussion was presented in terms of bringing one
action after the other in an envisioned chronological sequence. Never-
theless, this would not be mandatory and it might even endanger the suc-
cess of the actions. Many conservation groups have attempted to halt a
particular polluter by bringing each action under each statute or common
law theory at the same time. One difficulty in bringing subsequent
actions would be the possibility of res judicata being used to defeat all
actions following the first. 123
In conclusion, it must be borne in mind that all to often:
119. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 111%, § 1042 (1969).
120. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 111%, § 1036 (1969). See also supra note 117 for
the criteria used.
121. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 111/2, § 1041 (1969). Most notable about this pro-
vision is that it allows the petitioning party to take his action directly to the appel-
late court.
122. A situation which could become more significant as the Army abandons
more and more property along the lake deeding it back to the Chicago Park District.
123. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT OF JUDGMENTS H§ 62, 68 (1942); United States v.
California and Oregon Land Co., 192 U.S. 355 (1904); Cromwell v. County of Sac,
94 U.S. 351 (1876).
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[T]he appropriate agencies hear and attend to the voices which call for getting
the job of road building done as quickly and cheaply as possible. But there are also
individuals who put a high premium on the maintenance of parks, wetlands, and
open space. Are their voices adequately heard and their claims adequately taken
into account in the decisional process? 124
It is the hope and the motive behind this discussion that these voices will
be heard-that the judiciary will, as they have in the past, utilize what-
ever means are necessary to ensure a government responsive to both ma-
jority rule and minority rights.
Arthur H. Boelter, Jr.
124. Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resource Law: Effective Judi-
cial Intervention, 68 MIcH. L. REV. 473, 496 (1970).
